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Partially Informed Agents Can Form
a Swarm in a Nash Equilibrium
Aykut Yıldız, Student Member, IEEE, and Arif Bülent Özgüler
Abstract—Foraging swarms in one-dimensional motion with
incomplete position information are studied in the context of a
noncooperative differential game. In this game, the swarming
individuals act with partial information as it is assumed that each
agent knows the positions of only the adjacent ones. It is shown
that a Nash equilibrium solution that exhibits many features of a
foraging swarm such as movement coordination, self-organization,
stability, and formation control exists.
Index Terms—Artificial potentials, dynamic game theory, dy-
namic multi-agent systems, finite horizon, Nash equilibrium, social
foraging, swarming behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
The motivations for collective movements such as schooling of
fish, flocking of birds, and herding of sheep are having protection
from predators, saving energy, and locating food sources with ease
[1]. Such swarms have attracted attentions of scientists and engineers
in many disciplines. The following features of a swarm are most
remarkable [2]: i) no member in a swarm views the whole picture, but
their decentralized actions result in a collective behavior; ii) simple
actions of the members described in [3] result in a complex behavior
of the swarm; iii) there are no leaders commanding the others so that
many swarms are self-propelled; iv) there is limited communication
based on local information among members. Such features of swarms
are expressed by the notions of coordinated group behavior, self
organization, stability, collision avoidance and distributed control [4].
Engineers have based their designs of multi-robot or multi-vehicle
systems mainly on these concepts [5]–[8].
In recent years, swarm analysis techniques have focused on three
principal methodologies; namely, model-based approaches, Lyapunov
analysis, and simulations. Compared to model based approaches,
simulation based approaches suffer from convergence, accuracy, and
computational complexity issues. On the other hand, while Lyapunov
based methods (e.g., [9]–[11]) remain confined to the stability (bounded-
ness) analysis, a model based approach allows a more comprehensive
theoretical analysis that may reveal important structural properties.
Noncooperative game theory, in particular the notion of Nash
equilibrium, is ideally suited for studying collective behaviors that
are caused by decentralized individual motives and actions. It thus
seems that quests into the nature and the origin of collective behavior
in swarms is a natural application area for game theoretical models;
but, such studies are surprisingly rare. Currently, the application has
mainly been limited to two-person games since the objective was
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114E270. Recommended by Associate Editor A. Garcia.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neering, Bilkent University, Ankara 06800, Turkey (e-mail: ayildiz@ee.bilkent.
edu.tr; ozguler@ee.bilkent.edu.tr).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TAC.2015.2411912
mainly to understand the “motive formation” of animals, [12], [13]. In
studying multi-robot, multi-vehicle systems cooperative game theory
has been the main tool applied since the emphasis [14] is on the
“design” of a swarm system, rather than an analysis which strives to
“explain” collective behavior. Vehicle platooning or air traffic control
in automated environments require conflict resolution so that game
theory is used in [15]–[18] for the purpose of coordination.
First studies, which demonstrate that a swarming behavior may
result as a Nash equilibrium are [19] and [20]. A main assumption in
both [19] and [20] is that each agent has a complete information of its
pairwise distances to other agents. The main contribution of this article
is to relax this assumption by considering that each agent has a partial
information access and knows its pairwise distances to neighboring
agents only. The assumption that a member interacts with (exchanges
information with or has sensory perception of) all of the remaining
members of a swarm may be a realistic assumption when the swarm
size is not too large or while designing a swarm system from scratch. It
may not, however, be realistic in large biological swarms or if the cost
of communication is substantial. The swarm is thus assumed to have
the structure of a line topology communication network as opposed to
a complete topology network.
The technical note is organized as follows. In Section II, the main
noncooperative dynamic game is introduced for the case where target
location is exactly known by the agents. In the remaining part of
Section II, main results and their implications are given. Section III
is on conclusions and the proofs of the main theorems are given in the
Appendix.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULTS
One dimensional motion of swarms with incomplete position infor-
mation is modeled as a noncooperative infinite dimensional dynamic
game in this section. Every agent in the swarm is assumed to know its
distance to only the adjacent agents. Each swarm member minimizes
the total work done in a time interval [0, T ] by controlling its velocity.
The total work done by the i-th member of the swarm for i = 1, . . . , N
can be formulated as




















with the convention that x0(t) = xN+1(t) = 0. Each agent is assumed
to adjust its control so as to minimize this expression. Here, N is
the number of agents, xi(t) is the position of the ith member. The
control input of agent-i is assumed to be its velocity ui(t) = ẋi(t).
The first component of the total work is the environment potential
which monitors the toxicity or the amount of food source at position x.
Here, it is selected as a quadratic profile as in [21]. The second
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component is the kinetic energy term which measures the total effort
of the ith member. The minimization of this effort term implies that
the swarm members use their energy efficiently which is an essential
feature of actual biological swarms [22]. The third term in the total
work done is the attraction potential energy and the last term is the
repulsion potential energy. The attraction and repulsion potentials are
again chosen following [21], [23]. The parameters f , a, and r are
the weights of the environment, attraction, and repulsion potential
terms, respectively. These weights are thus assumed to be of the same
value for all swarm members, which is a reasonable assumption for
biological swarms consisting of the same species.
The optimization performed by the swarm members is
min
ui
{Li} subject to ẋi = ui, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N. (2)
This is thus a noncooperative dynamic game and we will investigate
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium of this game. For
a concise exposition, we give the main result only for the specified
terminal condition case of xi(T ) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N in (1).
(See [24] for the general free terminal condition case.) The closed-
form solution will be obtained in Appendix through the approaches
outlined in [25] and [26].
We will see in Appendix that solution of the above problems
requires solving nonlinear differential equations that do not obey any
Lipschitz condition. Therefore, neither the existence nor the unique-
ness of a Nash equilibrium is clear at the outset.
We now describe the main features of the solution to the game
played by agents. Consider the position vector of the N agents
x(t) := [x1(t) . . . xN (t)]
′, and the vector of pairwise distances




where “prime” denotes transpose. Let M ∈ R(N−1)×N be such
that Mi,i = 1, Mi,i+1 = −1, Mi,j = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, j =
1, . . . , N , i = j = i+ 1. Thus, the i-th row of M has all zeros except
a 1 and a −1 at its i-th and (i+ 1)-st positions, respectively. Consider
the singular value decomposition
M = UΣV ′ (3)
for unitary matrices V ∈ RN×N , U ∈ R(N−1)×(N−1). The matrix M
has one zero singular value and N − 1 distinct singular values all in the
open interval (0, 2). The N singular values σ1 > σ2 > . . . > σN−1 >
σN are non-degenerate so that the columns of U and of V are unique
up to sign. Let





, αk := σk
√
a, k = 1, . . . , N − 1 (4)
and σN = αN := 0. The time constants α
−1
k will determine how x(t)
and y(t) evolve in time.
Define
bk(t) :=











and consider B(t) := diag[b1(t), . . . , bN−1(t), ((T − t)/(T ))],
C(t) := r diag[c1(t), . . . , cN−1(t), (((T − t)t)/(2))]
Q := diag[U, 1], r = [ 1 0 . . . 0 1 0 ]′ ∈ RN . (6)
Theorem 1: Given any r ∈ (0,∞), there exists a0 ∈ (0,∞) such
that for each value a ∈ (0, a0) of the attraction parameter, a unique
Nash equilibrium with specified terminal condition of the partial
information game (1)–(2) exists. This Nash solution has the following
properties:
P1. The initial ordering among the N agents in the queue is preserved
during [0, T ].
P2. The vector of pairwise distances and sum at time t is given by
y(t) = QB(t)Q′y(0) +QC(t)Q′r. (7)
P3. For every T and as T → ∞, the swarm size dmax(t) :=
maxi,j |xi(t)− xj(t)| remains bounded in [0, T ].
It follows that self-organized (no leader) agents, each individually
optimizing its effort, end up in a coordinated movement towards the
foraging location. Here, we emphasize as a fundamental feature of
Nash equilibrium that if each agent minimizes its total work (1), which
only requires the position information of agents adjacent to it and the
knowledge that the location of food (or the least toxic region) is the
origin, then the foraging swarm behavior characterized by P1–P3 is
expected. The swarm that results from this decentralized action is such
that the initial ordering among agents is preserved, it is stable (its size
is bounded) by P3, and the distance between the consecutive agents
can be computed by P2 at any given time. Also by P2, the last entry
of y(t) gives the swarm-center x̄(t) := ((x1(t) + . . .+ xN (t))/(N))
as x̄(t) = ((T − t)/(T ))x̄(0), which monotonically approaches the
target location as t → T and ends up at the origin at T .
The proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix (see Remark A.1) will
show that if a > 0 is sufficiently large, then the existence conclusion
of Theorem 1 also holds true. It is, however, still an open question
whether a Nash solution exists without the assumption of a small or
large attraction parameter a.
III. CONCLUSION
The results in this article complement the (more comprehensive)
result of [20] that was based on the hypothesis of complete informa-
tion. The main contribution in both has been to show that a collective
behavior of foraging swarm can result from self-organized actions of
individual agents. This is a large step in explaining the phenomena of
biological swarms.
The prices paid in going from the complete to partial information
assumptions are described in [24] and they can be summarized as:
a slower convergence to the foraging location, more dependence on
the initial conditions, and having to additionally assume an ordering
relation such as the attraction parameter a is small (or large), or
equivalently, that the repulsion parameter r is large (or small). The
simulations carried out in [24] and our intuition indicate that the unique
Nash solution of Theorem 1 is actually valid for all a, r > 0.
APPENDIX
This section contains a proof of Theorem 1. The proof is rather
technical and long because an essential task is to establish the “pos-
itivity” of certain time-varying matrices in the foraging interval [0, T ].
We refer the reader to [24] for the result in the free terminal condition
case and for details.
The optimal control problem that the ith agent needs to solve, i.e.,
minimize (1) subject to (2), is first considered, [27]. Applying the
necessary conditions of optimal control on Hamiltonian as in [20], we
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The “signum vector” s is piecewise-constant in the interval
[0, T ] with each constant value obtained by a permutation of en-
tries in [ 1 0 . . . 0 −1 ]′. This is because its ith entry si =∑i+1
j=i−1,j =i sgn(x
i − xj) is equal to 1 if agent i is leading the queue,
−1 if i is the last in queue, and 0 otherwise. Also in (8), A is the
symmetric tridiagonal matrix












where M is as defined prior to (3) and a is the attraction parameter
in (1). Note that the matrix V in (3) is such that A = aM ′M =
V aΣ′ΣV ′ = V diag[D2, 0]V ′, D := diag[α1, . . . , αN−1]. We will
now obtain a solution to (8) under the assumption that s(t) = s(0)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We first list certain properties of the matrix A.
LetBn(t)denote then-th Bernoulli polynomial (see e.g., [28, Ch. 12]).










































sign {βn(t)} = sign {γn(t)} = (−1)n, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (11)
Proof: By the defining equation for Bernoulli polynomials ((yexy)/




n/n!), we can write bk(t) of (5) as
2αkTe
(2τ−1)αkT

















Subtracting and dividing by 2αkT , and letting τ :=1−(t/2T ), we get
e(2τ−1)αkT − e−(2τ−1)αkT







which leads to the expression for bk(t) in (9) and (10). A similar
procedure applied to ck(t) also leads to the expansion in (9), (10) for
ck(t). The odd-numbered Bernoulli polynomials have constant sign in
the interval (0.5, 1) with B1(τ) having positive sign [29, Ch. 23]. Now,
B′2n+1(τ) = (2n+ 1)B2n(τ) for n ≥ 1 so that sign{B′2n+1(1)} =
sign{B2n(1)}. Since B2n(1) are the second Bernoulli numbers, it fol-
lows that sign{B′2n+1(1)} = (−1)n−1 for n ≥ 1. Thus, B2n+1(τ)
is decreasing to 0 as τ → 1 if and only if n is even, which gives
sign{B2n+1(τ)} = (−1)n, ∀τ ∈ (0.5, 1). This implies (11) by the
expressions in (10). 






























for initial time t0 ≥ 0 with r being the repulsion parameter. The






s(s2I −A)−1 −(s2I −A)−1
−A(s2I −A)−1 s(s2I −A)−1
]
gives that












φ21(t)=−V diag[α1sinh(α1t), . . ., αN−1sinh(αN−1t), 0]V ′. (14)
Moreover, integration results in
























Using the boundary condition x(T ) = 0 in (13) for t = T gives
φ11(T )x(0) + φ12(T )p(0) + [ψ1(T, 0)− ψ2(T, 0)]s(0) = 0 which
can be solved for p(0) since φ12(T ) is nonsingular. It follows that
there is a candidate solution of (8) for every x(0). This solution is
x(t) =
{





ψ1(t, 0)− φ12(t) [φ12(T )]−1 ψ1(T, 0)
}
s(0). (16)
Proof of Theorem 1: Let us assume x1(t) > x2(t) > · · · > xN (t)
without loss of generality so that s(0)′ = [ 1 0 . . . 0 −1 ]′.
Substituting (14) and (15) into (16) yields
x(t) = V B(t)V ′x(0) + V C(t)V ′s(0). (17)
Note that the nonsingular matrix [M ′ w], where w ∈ RN is a vector














and both B(t) and C(t) are matrix functions of Σ′Σ. Hence, the
























We now show that with such y(t), the ordering of the agents indeed
remains the same, i.e., sign yi(t) = sign yi(0) for all i = 1, . . . ,
N − 1 and t ∈ [0, T ]. We establish this for some (small enough) values
of the attraction parameter a > 0. Let us consider the sub-vector yd :=
[x1 − x2 . . . xN−1 − xN ]′ of y, Then, with rd := [1 0 . . . 0 1]′,
(7) gives yd(t) = K(t)yd(0) + L(t)rd, K(t) := U diag[b1(t), . . . ,
bN−1(t)]U
′, L(t) := U diag[c1(t), . . . , cN−1(t)]U ′, which are both
positive definite matrices for every t ∈ [0, T ] by the fact that bi(t)
and ci(t) are positive functions of t ∈ [0, T ] for i=1, . . . , N−1. The
matrixU of (3) that occurs here can be written explicitly by [30, p. 514],
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as U=[Uij ], Uij=
√
(2/N) sin(((N−j)iπ)/N), so that, for i, j=1,
































We now show that, there exist values for the attraction parameter a > 0
such that for all i, j = 1, . . . , N − 1 and t ∈ [0, T ], Kij(t) > 0 and




















































By these expressions, it follows that Kij(t) = KN−j,N−i(t),
Lij(t) = LN−j,N−i(t) for all i, j, i.e., K and L are centrosymmetric
(or bisymmetric) matrices, [31]. This allows us to only show the
positivity of the entries with





























































































































We now compute the finite sums over k and t. Let E(N) read as “an
















−1, i− j = E(N)




−1, i+ j = E(N)
N − 1, i+ j = E(N)
}
= 0
where the last equality is by (20). Let t1 := t− i+ j, t2 := t+ i− j,




























































































−1, t1 = E(N)




−1, t2 = E(N)




−1, t3 = E(N)




−1, t4 = E(N)
N − 1, t4 = E(N)
})
. (22)
By (20), it is easy to see that if tl = E(N) for some l = 1, 2, 3, 4, then






































At this stage, rather than Kij(t), it will be more convenient to consider
the expression for Ki,N−j(t) for





, . . . , N − 1. (24)
With this change of index, we are still considering the same subset of
entries of K but their expressions will be simpler. Substituting N − j
for j in the above expression, we have
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where O(N) reads “odd multiple of N .” Writing out a few terms of










































We now separate the even and odd k in the summations with respect














































2mN − 2(i+ j) + 4k+ 2







2mN − 2(i− j) + 4k+ 2







2mN + 2(i− j) + 4k+ 2







2mN + 2(i+ j) + 4k+ 2
2tN + 2k+ 1
)⎫⎬
⎭ (27)
For fixed m and k, the smallest indexed β occurs in the first term in
the brackets. By the expression in (10), the sign of S is determined
by the sign of βmN−i−j+2k for small enough attraction parameter
a > 0 because βmN−i−j+2k is divisible by the smallest power of a
among all β that occur in the above expression. It follows by (11)
that, sign(βmN−i−j+2k) = (−1)mN−i−j for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since m
is odd, we have sign(S) = (−1)N (−1)i+j . This establishes that,
there exists a > 0 such that for all i, j as in (24), Ki,N−j(t) > 0,
t ∈ [0, T ]. The proof of positivity of the matrix L is obtained in exactly
the same manner since γn(t) of Lemma A.1 replacing βn(t) in the last
expression above yields Li,N−j(t). This proves that there is a Nash
equilibrium in which the initial ordering among the agents is preserved
in the whole interval [0, T ].
Here, it will be shown that swarm size is bounded. Since x1(t) >
x2(t) > · · · > xN (t), the swarm size is equal to x1(t)− xN (t) which
is given by




















that results from (7), where qij is the ijth entry of the matrix Q of (6)




























Considering the first and second derivatives of bm(t) and cm(t), it is
easy to show that maxt |bm(t)| = 1 and maxt |cm(t)| = (1/α2m)[1−
(1/(cosh(αmT/2)))], where αk is given in (4). Since all the terms in
the right hand side have finite positive values, x1(t)− xN (t) is also
finite. This completes the boundedness proof.
We finally show that Nash solution is unique with respect to strate-
gies that are continuous against initial positions. Suppose that there
are changes in the ordering of the agents at the n− 1 time instants
{t1, . . . , tn−1} ∈ (0, T ), with n ≥ 2. The integer n is finite since
the terminal condition should be satisfied exactly, not asymptotically.
Let t0 := 0 and tn := T . For k = 1, . . . , n− 1, the response at t ∈
(tk−1, tk) can be expressed in terms of the response at tk−1 as
z(t)=φk(t−tk−1)z(tk−1)+ψk(t, tk−1)sk−1, t∈(tk−1, tk) (30)
where φk(t− tk−1) is the state transition matrix for t ∈ (tk−1, tk)




Pφk−111 (t− tk−2)P ′ Pφ
k−1
12 (t− tk−2)P ′
Pφk−121 (t− tk−2)P ′ Pφ
k−1
22 (t− tk−2)P ′
]
where P is a permutation matrix and the sizes of four partitions are all






Pφk−112 (t− tk−2)P ′
Pφk−122 (t− tk−2)P ′
]
dτ.

















Multiplying both sides on the left by [I 0], where I has sizeN, we have
















3094 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, VOL. 60, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2015
We employ the boundary condition x(T ) = 0 and obtain
0 = Ω11x(0) + Ω12p(0) +
∑n
l=1
Γl1sl−1, where Ωij is the ijth
block of Ω :=
∏n
l=1




φm(tm − tm−1)]ψl(tl, tl−1). We now show that Ω12 is
nonsingular for small enough a so that p(0) is uniquely determined. In


















for the permutation matrix P that represents the ordering change
passing from the interval l − 1 to l. It follows that as a → 0
Ω →
[
I −(tn − tn−1)I
0 I
][








so that Ω12 → −
∑n
l=1
(tl − tl−1)I = −T I , which implies that Ω12









Let us now consider the response in the vicinity of t1, the first
change of ordering instant, at which (30) gives x(t) = [φ111(t)x(0) +
φ112(t)p(0)] + ψ
1
1(t, 0)s0. Suppose xi(t1) = xj(t1), i.e., the ith and
the jth agents change positions at t1. Substituting p(0) obtained in (34)
and multiplying both sides of this equation by the row vector wTij , all
entries of which are 0 except 1 in its ith entry and −1 in its jth entry,
we obtain





















For ε sufficiently small and t ∈ (t1, t1 + ε), the left hand side can be
made as small as desired without any permutation in Ω and Γl1 since
no change of ordering occurs in this time interval. By continuity of
strategies with respect to x(0), xi(t)− xj(t) and the first term on the
right hand side vary continuously and can assume an infinity of values,
whereas the last term can only take a finite number of values. It follows
that (35) can not hold. This contradiction implies that the solution with
no ordering change is unique for all 0 < a < a0 for some a0 > 0. 
Remark A.1: The infinite summation expression for S, crucially
used in establishing the existence of Nash equilibrium, also indicates
that sign(S) is determined by the sign of −βmN+i+j+2k+1 for large
enough attraction parameter a > 0. This is because βmN+i+j+2k+1
is divisible by the largest power of a among all β that occur in
that expression. It follows by (11) that, sign(−βmN+i+j+2k+1) =
(−1)mN+i+j for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since m is odd, we again have
sign(S) = (−1)N (−1)i+j . This establishes that, for large a > 0 and
for all i, j as in (24), Ki,N−j(t) > 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. Similarly, one can
conclude the positivity of L. Therefore, Nash equilibrium exists for
sufficiently large values of the attraction parameter as well. 
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